The calculated risk at the heart of President Trump’s initial escalation with Iran wasn’t simply about nuclear deterrence or missile control; it was a gamble predicated on the swift and improbable collapse of the Iranian theocracy. The stated goal of regime change, initially presented alongside more conventional military objectives, revealed a strategic calculus – or perhaps a miscalculation – that hinged on exploiting internal Iranian discontent. This move, however audacious, immediately resurrected the ghosts of past interventions and the inherent contradictions of promoting regime change while simultaneously disavowing responsibility for its aftermath.
The shift in messaging from the White House, evidenced by Trump’s omission of regime change as a goal during a recent public appearance, underscores the evolving assessment of the situation. This isn’t necessarily a retreat, but a recalibration. The original framing – “Take over your government. It will be yours to take” – placed the onus of upheaval squarely on the Iranian people, a rhetorical device that absolves the US of direct involvement while simultaneously offering tacit support for insurrection. However, the reality on the ground, as assessed by both military experts like Robert A. Pape of the University of Chicago (“Air power rarely produces friendly regime change”) and intelligence agencies like the CIA, points to a far more likely outcome: a consolidation of power by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). This outcome, while representing a change in personnel, would hardly constitute the “genuine regime change” Trump initially promised.
Source material: the Los Angeles Times.
Who benefits and who loses from this potential scenario? The IRGC stands to gain significantly, solidifying its control over Iran’s political and economic landscape. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s death by airstrike, as reported, would remove a key figurehead, but the underlying power structure of the IRGC remains intact. The US, in this scenario, loses credibility and faces the prospect of a more entrenched and potentially aggressive adversary. The Iranian people, particularly the pro-democracy movement, are the most significant losers, facing continued repression and the crushing of their aspirations for political reform. The fragmented nature of the Iranian democratic opposition, as highlighted by Richard N. Haass, a former State Department official, further complicates the situation; they lack the organization and resources to effectively challenge the IRGC. This echoes the post-Saddam Iraq scenario, where the absence of a cohesive opposition led to a power vacuum filled by sectarian violence and instability.
The abandonment of the “Pottery Barn rule” – the principle of owning the consequences of intervention, articulated by Colin L. Powell before the 2003 Iraq War – is a critical shift in US foreign policy. Trump’s message, “I’ll break it, you own it,” represents a stark departure from the post-World War II commitment to nation-building and stabilization. This approach, while potentially minimizing US casualties and financial burdens, carries the risk of creating a failed state or a regional power vacuum, mirroring the outcomes in Libya after the overthrow of Moammar Kadafi. The administration’s failure, as noted by Kelly Shannon of George Washington University, to proactively support and prepare the Iranian opposition further exacerbates this risk. The lack of coordinated support – including financial assistance, protection for dissidents, and ensuring the safety of political prisoners – suggests a limited commitment to fostering a genuine transition to democracy.
Several scenarios are now emerging, each with distinct implications. The “Venezuela scenario,” where the US supports a cooperative successor regime, appears to be Trump’s preferred outcome, but relies on the unlikely willingness of the IRGC to negotiate. The “Hamas scenario,” a weakened but still hostile Iran, represents a continuation of the status quo, albeit with diminished capabilities. The “Libya scenario,” a descent into factional warfare, is the most destabilizing outcome, potentially drawing in regional actors and escalating the conflict. However, the most dangerous possibility, as Haass warns, is a second massacre of Iranian dissidents, should the opposition be left to face the full force of the IRGC without adequate support. The political chess move to watch next isn’t a military escalation, but rather the administration’s response to the inevitable consolidation of power by the IRGC. Will Trump attempt to engage with the new leadership, effectively legitimizing their rule? Or will he double down on sanctions and covert operations, risking further instability and potentially triggering a wider regional conflict? The answer to that question will define the long-term consequences of this gamble on regime change.
